The differences between the authors of the Coleman report and their critics make clear why the effectiveness of schools will always remain controversial as long as inferential statistics are employed to determine it. Controversy is inevitable when measurement requires the satisfaction of assumptions antithetical to the teaching processes through which the effects of schools must be produced. Operant conditioning, by providing means for determining independent-variable effectiveness and dependent-variable effects in a single set of operants, lets such counterproductive assumptions be set aside. (Author)
However, they put forth a logically questionable conclusion of their own.
They contended that "the typical finding of 'no significant difference' strongly implies that no new technique, no new practice, no new methodology invented by experienced educators is ever any better or any worse than what has been going on all along" (p. 9). Guba and Clark found this conclusion "statistically incredible" (p. 9). They exaggerated, no doubt for rhetorical purposes, both the success and unsuccess revealed by studies of effectiveness of schools. But hyperbole aside, surely the frequency of negative findings is insufficient grounds for reasoning that those findings must in fact be positive. But deducing that func-relationships are present or absent falls short of demonstrating they do or do not exist in fact. Deduction is at best a prelude to demonstration, at worst a tautological exercise beyond proof and disproof alike.
Guba and Clark criticized Coleman on the secondary issue of which inferences may be validly arrived at on the basis of manipulation of semantic signs:
the numerical symbols constituting the manipulanda of inferential statistics.
But the primary issue is, How are the phenomenal-significate responses of students on which semantic-sign manipulation is based --responses constituting the manipulanda of teaching--effectively produced by schools? It is only through production of such responses by schools that functional relationships between schools and scholastic achievement may be demonstrably made known. The same applies to extrascholastic and achievement variables; the former must produce the latter before functional relationships between them may be known to operate.
In Guba and Clark's judgment, the negative findings which Coleman's unfavorable judgment of schools is based on are cause by misapplication of inferential statistics despite the fact that the assumptions requisite to their employment, in the typical case, remain unmet. "All of these assumptions," Guba and Clark observed, "are in some particulars unrealistic for education" (p. 107). But only belatedly did they begin to approach the heart of the matter: the inappropriateness of inferential statistics in evaluating scholastic effectiveness precisely to the extent that these assumptions have been met. Almost in passing, they remarked that treatment invariance is not only quite difficult to achieve but may be undesirable, since the treatment may be one that could profit from continuous improvement But this in turn requires (as they did not make clear) an evaluation system that is indistinguishable from teaching; a framework within whose bounds may be found a single set of operations for determining the impact of educational practices in both of the senses, teaching and evaluation, that the term determination implies (Throne, 1970) .
Through operations called teaching (or training, etc.) , an educator may determine, in the sense of produce, the level of achievement a child attains.
The educator may also determine, in the sense of measure, that selfsame level of achievement. However, if measurement is undertaken through an active process of response manipulation to criterion, rather than (as in the case of inferential statistics) a passive one of comparison of obtained results against a theoretical expectancy (i.e., null hypothesis testing), all operational distinctions between teaching and evaluation may be dissolved (Throne, 1971a, b) .
In effect, if teaching implies the production rather than measurement of behavior, then, given the manipulative processes intrinsic to teaching, the assumptions necessary for evaluating teaching through inferential statistics must not be met. The demands of teaching, not those of evaluation antithetical to teaching, must dictate the arrangements under which evaluation data on teaching are obtained (Throne, 1971a, b) . To measure the effectiveness of teaching under the restrictions on teaching which assumptions aside from teaching impose, is not to measure teaching effectiveness at all. To label inferential statistics as inappropriate in evaluating teaching effectiveness on grounds of unfeasibility is to miss the point. They are inappropriate because the assumptions making their operations valid are ipso facto antithetical to the valid operations of teaching.
Operant Conditioning
That different operations are implicit in the terms teaching and evaluation is an article of faith in education. It is therefore not surprising that educators seem unaware that a basis for producing teaching effects and measuring teaching effectiveness through a single set of operations has long been available in the strategies and tactics of the operant conditioning model developed by B.F. Skinner (e.g., Skinner 1938 Skinner , 1965 Skinner , 1968 What has been referred to as the principle of consequential determinism (Throne, 1970) is the keystone on which these strategies and tactics have been built.
According to the principle of consequential determinism: "Behavior is a function of its consequences" (Skinner, 1938, p. 63) . That is, the probability of a member of a behavioral class occurring is a function of the consequences that 6 other members of the class encounter. If consequences are reinforcing, the probability of occurrence will increase; if extinguishing or aversive, it will decrease. If consequences are neutral, it will remain unchanged. It follows that the presentation or htithdrawal (or withholding) of whictiever consequences demonstrably increase or decrease the probability of criterion behavior, or successive approximations of it, may be made contingent on such increases or decreases, as the case may be. It further follows that if the effects of teaching are determined (in the sense of produced) on a contingent basis, then the effectiveness of consequences may be simultaneously determined (in the sense of measured) by those self-same effects. Neither the success of teaching nor its failure need be determined (in either sense) independently of teaching. For example, if a subject is taught to write his name, count to five, or spell 10 words, the effectiveness of the operations employed is revealed in the effects obtained.
Ineffectiveness is shown by un-effects. In either case, evaluative operations distinct from teaching are unnecessary. Teaching and evaluation thus coalesce (Throne, 1971a, b) .
The principle of consequential determinism is the key, therefore, to the problem raised by the inappropriateness under any circumstances of inferential statistics in evaluating teaching. Insofar as an educator succeeds in introducing or withdrawing (or withholding) consequential stimuli sufficient to determine (produce) criterion responses, he determines (measures)
by the outcome the effectiveness of the stimuli employed.
Precisely which components of effective stimuli evoke obtained response effects can be determined (produced and measured) through a differential reinforcement strategy in which all stimulus components other than those 7 in question are controlled (so-called "component analysis"). Thus the issue of stimulus necessity is transformed into one of stimulus sufficiency. Of course, the magnitude, longevity, and generalizability of effects (and certain "side-effects") of consequential stimuli will vary, depending on the reinforcement history of the subjects on whom the stimuli impinge. These effects are not immutable; they may be altered by presenting or withdrawing (or withholding) other consequences with different reinforcement values.
For example, if contingent teacher attention fails to reinforce academic achievement, maybe special privileges will (e.g., opportunity
to leave classroom early). Also, effects of consequences can be reversed.
For example, teacher attention may be made reinforcing by pairing it with a stimulus that already is (e.g., classroom recitation). As the reinforcement value of teacher attention subsequently increases, it may be used to reinforce criterion behavior (academic achievement), not possible before.
Conclusion
The differences between critics of teaching like Coleman and of evaluation like Guba and Clark make clear why school effectiveness will always remain controversial as long as inferential statistics are employed to measure it.
Controversy is inevitable when evaluation demands, feasibly or not, that assumptions antithetical to teaching be fulfilled. This issue is obviated by operant conditioning. Operant conditioning measures teaching effectiveness by producing achievement effects, guaranteeing they reflect the operations of teaching only, instead of evaluative operations confounded with and hobbling teaching. In a word, operant conditioning makes functional distinctions between teaching and evaluation obsolete. 
